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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The negative attitudes of South Africans towards non-citizens,migrants and refugees have been documented in severalrecent studies. Xenophobia has been officially recognized as amajor problem by the state and steps have been taken by gov-
ernment and the South African Human Rights Commission to “roll
back xenophobia.” Since anti-immigrant intolerance is a global phe-
nomenon, should South Africans be singled out in this regard? This
paper seeks to contextualize the South African situation by comparing
the attitudes of South Africans with citizens from several other coun-
tries in the SADC; namely, Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia,
Swaziland and Zimbabwe. 
In practical policy terms, xenophobia undermines social cohesion,
peaceful co-existence, good governance and human rights observance.
In addition, SADC is a region composed of 14 states committed to
greater integration and cooperation. To encourage or allow citizens of
one member state to think and act in xenophobic ways about citizens of
another, is ultimately extremely destructive of regional cooperation and
harmony. This study therefore aims to show (for the states studied)
which are the “rogue states” in which citizens have not yet come to
terms with a basic requirement of regional cooperation: tolerance and
acceptance of people from neighbouring SADC countries. This, in turn,
should help identify those governments who have an actual or potential
problem on their hands and which therefore need to take the task of
“rolling back xenophobia” far more seriously than they do at present. 
The paper is based on a SAMP Project implemented in 2001-2
called the National Immigration Policy Survey (NIPS). The survey, of a
representative sample of urban residents, was implemented simultane-
ously in 5 SADC states. A comparable data set was extracted from a
1999 SAMP survey in South Africa. The survey was designed to meas-
ure citizen knowledge of migration, attitudes towards non-citizens, and
immigration and refugee policy preferences.
The survey found that citizens across the region consistently tend to
exaggerate the numbers of non-citizens in their countries, to view the
migration of people within the region as a “problem” rather than an
opportunity, and to scapegoat non-citizens. The intensity of these feel-
ings varies significantly from country to country. The harshest senti-
ments are expressed by the citizens of South Africa, Namibia and, to a
lesser extent, Botswana. The citizens of Swaziland, Mozambique and
Zimbabwe are considerably more relaxed about the presence of non-
citizens in their countries. 
Negative attitudes in the anti-foreign “troika” (South Africa,
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Namibia, Botswana) are so pervasive and widespread that it is actually
impossible to identify any kind of “xenophobe profile.” In other words,
the poor and the rich, the employed and the unemployed, the male and
the female, the black and the white, the conservative and the radical,
all express remarkably similar attitudes. This poses a significant problem
of explanation because it runs counter to the more general belief that
certain groups in a population (usually those who are or who perceive
themselves to be threatened by outsiders) are more prone to xenopho-
bic attitudes than others. It also provides a massive public education
challenge not only of knowing where to begin but deciding who to tar-
get. Within countries where there is greater tolerance, a more classic
pattern pertains. That is, those with the most to lose from the presence
of non-citizens – the unskilled and the unemployed – exhibit much
more negative attitudes than other groups.
One of the more interesting results is the apparent absence of any
sense of solidarity with other countries in the SADC. Given the
longevity of the SADC as a formal institution, this is a significant find-
ing. The absence of any real sense of “regional consciousness” (of partic-
ipation in a regional grouping whose interests are greater than the sum
of its parts) has very direct implications for migration issues. Citizens of
these SADC countries make very little distinction between migrants
from other SADC countries and those from elsewhere in Africa and
even Europe and North America. Where attitudes are negative, they
are uniformly negative; where positive, uniformly positive. An urgent
challenge confronting the SADC and migration-related initiatives such
as the Migration Dialogue in Southern Africa (MIDSA) is therefore to
develop strategies to build a new regional consciousness amongst citi-
zens and policy-makers. 
Most citizens would prefer national governments to “get tough” with
migrants and refugees. There is widespread suspicion that refugees are
not genuine and there is significant fear that migrants are an economic
threat. Perhaps the most significant and consistent finding is the fear –
certainly not confined to Southern Africa – that migrants steal rather
than create jobs. Although the majority of people in all countries see
immigrants as a threat to jobs, very few have personal knowledge or
experience of such an occurrence. Over 60% of respondents in South
Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Mozambique have never heard of any-
one being denied a job because it went to a foreigner; in Swaziland and
Botswana the percentage drops to 34% and 50%, respectively. Even
fewer people know from their own experience of someone being denied
a job because it went to a foreigner. Almost 90% of respondents in all
six countries have no personal experience of being denied a job because
it went to a foreigner. 
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When migration is viewed as a “threat” (as it clearly is amongst sig-
nificant portions of the population and amongst virtually everyone in
some countries) it is not unusual for citizens to prefer harsh policy meas-
ures. Rather shocking is the degree of support for border electrification.
But citizens also want to see armies at the borders, tough internal
enforcement and curtailment of basic rights. There is clearly a massive
job of education confronting government if policy-makers are to turn
around the obsession with control and exclusion and encourage a coun-
tervailing sense of the potential positive aspects of migration and immi-
gration. Here, the NIPS survey is particularly relevant. It shows that
across the region, citizens are prepared to accept and welcome non-citi-
zens if their economic impact is demonstrably positive. Hence, skills-
and investor-friendly immigration policies would not be a difficult sell
to citizens. Since such policies are inevitable if countries are to be and
remain globally competitive, it is important that policy and opinion-
makers begin to build a broad public consensus on this issue. There is
nothing more off-putting to a new immigrant who wants to put their
skills to work in and for a new country to find that they are the object
of scorn and vilification simply because of their accent or the colour of
their skin. 
MIGRATION POLICY SERIES NO. 30
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INTRODUCTION
The democratization of South Africa in 1994 brought majortransformation to one of the most racially divided andinequitable countries in the world. Representative govern-ment, a rights-based Constitution and the deracialization of
public life and the institutions of governance all testify to the extent
and depth of this transformation. 
The ANC government – in its attempts to overcome the divides of
the past and build new forms of social cohesion at the local, regional
and national level – embarked on an aggressive and inclusive nation-
building project. One unanticipated by-product of this project has been
a growth in intolerance towards outsiders. South Africa’s redefinition of
the boundaries of citizenship and belonging is based on the creation of a
“new other”; the “non-citizen”, the “foreigner”, the “alien”.1
Intolerance, bordering on xenophobia, has intensified dramatically
since 1994.2 Violence against foreign citizens and African refugees has
become increasingly common and communities are divided by hostility
and suspicion.3 In 1997, the Southern African Migration Project
(SAMP) set out to document the character and extent of xenophobic
sentiment in South Africa. Two national surveys confirmed that South
Africans were indeed highly xenophobic. The findings were reported in
a joint publication with the South African Human Rights Commission
in 2002.4
The primary sources of migrants to South Africa are the neighbour-
ing countries in SADC and various countries elsewhere in Africa.
Inevitably, therefore much South African xenophobic sentiment is
directed at people from countries such as Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and
Malawi. Francophone Africans also face a particularly difficult chal-
lenge since they are generally more visible.5 The home countries of
migrants are often stereotyped as being in utter chaos and South Africa,
by contrast, is portrayed as a haven of peace, calm and opportunity. In
the course of our research, the question has been raised at to whether
SAMP is “singling out” South Africa. In other words, perhaps the atti-
tudes of South Africans are not only justifiable in the circumstances but
very unlikely to be unique?
The general purpose of this paper, then, is to compare citizen atti-
tudes to migrants, immigrants, refugees and immigration policy across
the Southern African region. The more specific objective is to see
whether the well-documented xenophobic attitudes of South Africans
are echoed across the region. Are Southern Africans as intolerant of
outsiders as South Africans? Or do they display a more tolerant and less
paranoid set of attitudes? Many of these states have been through a similar
k
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post-independence nation-building process and although South Africa
is the “new kid on the block,” it is possible that decolonization and
nationalism have produced similar outcomes throughout the region. 
A second objective of the paper is to see whether attitudes vary from
country to country across the region. All states have their own unique
political and economic history and configuration but all have been
bound for decades into a single system of cross-border labour migration.6
It is therefore important to try and understand if the experience of
migration to other countries (which has been denied to most South
Africans) makes people less insular and more accepting of outsiders in
their own country.
Third, if attitudes do vary from country to country, then it is possible
to hypothesize that the migration history of the country may be a factor.
In other words, citizens of countries with little history of in-migration
(Lesotho, Mozambique), may have different attitudes from those which
have been destinations for migrants (South Africa, Botswana). Or
again, the citizens of countries with a long humanitarian tradition of
refugee protection may be far more accepting of refugees than a country
like South Africa with a long history of persecuting refugees.7
Fourth, multi-lateral cooperation in migration management has been
a consistently stated aim of SADC and many of its constituent govern-
ments.8 However, a regional approach would be considerably facilitated
by the existence of a “regional consciousness”; in other words, a strong
sense that there are regional migration interests that transcend narrow
national interests. A survey of this nature therefore provides the oppor-
tunity to assess the degree of regional consciousness amongst citizens of
a number of SADC states vis-à-vis a range of migration issues. At the
heart of this issue is whether and what kind of distinction citizens make
between migrants from inside and outside the region.
Finally, in practical policy terms, SAMP makes the assumption that
xenophobia undermines social cohesion, peaceful co-existence, good
governance and human rights observance. In addition, SADC is a
region composed of 14 states committed to greater integration and
cooperation. To encourage or allow citizens of one member state to
think and act in xenophobic ways about citizens of another, is ultimate-
ly extremely destructive of regional cooperation and harmony. This
study therefore aims to show (for the 6 states studied) which are the
“rogue states” in which citizens have not yet come to terms with a basic
requirement of regional cooperation: tolerance and acceptance of peo-
ple from neighbouring SADC countries. This, in turn, should help iden-
tify those governments who have an actual or potential problem on
their hands and which therefore need to take the task of “rolling back
xenophobia” far more seriously than they do at present. 
MIGRATION POLICY SERIES NO. 30
k
5
  
THE NATIONAL IMMIGRATION POLICY SURVEYS (NIPS) 
SAMP’s National Immigration Policy Survey (NIPS) was con-ducted in 2001-2 in five SADC countries: Botswana,Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe.9 A compara-ble data set for South Africa was extracted from an earlier
SAMP survey of South African citizens. The survey was based on an
extended, common questionnaire administered by teams of researchers
in each country. In total, 4 763 interviews were conducted in 6 coun-
tries.10 This is an extremely large data set for a survey of this kind. In
addition, the sample size in each individual country is sufficient to allow
reliable conclusions to be drawn for each one. The one proviso that
applies to all countries is that this was an urban sample which means
that the attitudes are nationally representative of the urban population
only. In the case of South Africa, the survey was originally conducted
amongst a national sample. In order to make the results comparable
with the other countries, however, the urban sub-sample of 1 035 was
extracted from the larger data set and is used in this analysis.11
A fieldwork training programme was conducted by each SAMP
country project leader to ensure that the fieldworkers asked questions in
a similar manner. Respondents spoke many different languages and
fieldwork teams were trained to translate questions into languages
understood by the respondents. The Mozambique questionnaire was
translated into Portuguese prior to implementation. The country surveys
were conducted using a similar sampling methodology. 
Tables 1 and 2 below provide basic demographics on the entire
dataset by country. Inspection of the tables will show that the people
interviewed reflect a diversity of age, education, socio-economic class,
and work status. Almost equal numbers of men and women were inter-
viewed. The collection of basic demographic variables of this depth and
variety allows for an analysis which goes beyond the general description
of national attitudes to identify attitudinal differences within the popu-
lation. 
k
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Table 1: Demographic Profile of Sample
South Africa Namibia Botswana Zimbabwe Mozambique Swaziland
Age: No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
16-24 221 21.5 215 29.3 282 36.1 271 36.8 230 30.7 123 18.9
25-34 246 23.9 194 26.5 277 35.5 204 27.7 193 25.8 220 33.8
35-49 299 29.1 186 25.4 157 20.1 169 23.0 213 28.5 215 33.0
50-98 263 25.6 138 18.8 65 8.3 92 12.5 112 15.0 93 14.3
Total 1 029 100.0 733 100.0 781 100.0 736 100.0 748 100.0 651 100.0
Formal Education:
None 22 2.1 43 5.7 44 5.7 17 2.3 43 5.8 14 2.0
Grades 136 13.1 101 13.5 155 19.9 76 10.4 235 31.5 50 7.2
1-7
Grades 697 67.3 455 60.7 408 52.4 502 68.4 367 49.1 304 43.6
8-12
Post 180 17.4 150 20.0 171 22.0 139 18.9 102 13.7 330 47.3
grad & 
diploma
Total 1 035 100.0 749 100.0 778 100.0 734 100.0 747 100.0 698 100.0
Race of Respondent:
White 365 35.3 90 12.0 5 0.6 14 1.9 24 3.2 6 0.8
Black 390 37.7 562 74.9 767 98.2 692 94.0 633 84.3 672 94.6
Coloured 140 13.5 97 12.9 9 1.2 28 3.8 89 11.9 30 4.2
Indian 140 13.5 1 0.1 0 0.0 1 0.1 5 0.7 1 0.1
Other 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.1 0 0.0 1 0.1
Total 1 035 100.0 750 100.0 781 100.0 736 100.0 751 100.0 710 100.0
Gender:
Male 517 50.0 367 51.0 347 44.4 383 53.6 425 58.6 354 49.9
Female 518 50.0 353 49.0 434 55.6 332 46.4 300 41.4 356 50.1
Total 1 035 100.0 720 100.0 781 100.0 715 100.0 725 100.0 710 100.0
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Table 2: Economic Characteristics of Sample
South Africa Namibia Botswana Zimbabwe Mozambique Swaziland
Class: No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
Poor 253 24.4 280 37.5 291 38.7 334 45.8 241 32.2 125 17.5
Working 266 25.7 269 36.1 203 27.0 134 18.4 202 27.0 348 48.6
class
Middle 425 41.1 151 20.2 243 32.4 207 28.4 250 33.4 206 28.8
class
Upper 76 7.3 35 4.7 10 1.3 26 3.6 43 5.7 15 2.1
middle
class
Upper 10 1.0 6 0.8 4 0.5 12 1.6 8 1.1 5 0.7
class
Don’t 5 0.5 5 0.7 0 0.0 17 2.3 5 0.7 17 2.4
know
Total 1035 100.0 746 100.0 751 100.0 730 100.0 749 100.0 716 100.0
Travel
Never 0 0.0 436 58.1 331 42.4 412 55.8 345 45.9 75 10.4
left
country
Travelled 0 0.0 179 23.9 333 42.6 208 28.2 242 32.2 457 63.2
outside
Lived 0 0.0 135 18.0 117 15.0 118 16.0 164 21.8 191 26.4
outside
Total 0 0.0 750 100.0 781 100.0 738 100.0 751 100.0 723 100.0
Work Status 
Formal 406 39.2 299 39.9 352 45.1 282 38.3 227 30.6 448 62.7
employ-
ment
Informal 56 5.4 69 9.2 56 7.2 136 18.5 125 16.9 64 9.0
employ-
ment
Unem- 190 18.4 202 27.0 185 23.7 114 15.5 131 17.7 89 12.4
ployed  
looking
Unem- 383 37.0 179 23.9 188 24.1 204 27.7 258 34.8 114 15.9
ployed  
not 
looking
Total 1035 100.0 749 100.0 781 100.0 736 100.0 741 100.0 715 100.0
   
MEASURES OF XENOPHOBIA
Xenophobia is defined in the Concise Oxford Dictionary as a“morbid dislike of foreigners.” Attempts to measure the inci-dence and prevalence of xenophobic attitudes on a nationalscale demand the use of national, quantitative surveys. Such
statistical measures of xenophobia are obviously open to interpretation
and debate. However, SAMP has endeavoured to develop a range of
indices which cover various different facets of xenophobic attitudes and
behaviours. These indices were developed in a series of planning work-
shops with all SAMP partners, independent experts and reviews of the
international comparative literature. Thus, while any one index certain-
ly does not “measure” xenophobia in and of itself, a general picture does
emerge from the various measures presented and discussed here.
The first, and most general, index measures attitudes towards the
presence of foreigners on national soil and what citizens expect govern-
ments to be doing about it. The World Values Survey regularly asks
respondents what government should do about people from other coun-
tries. SAMP’s previous research has already shown that South Africans
take an extremely restrictive view by international standards. This is
confirmed once again in the latest survey with 21% of South African
respondents wanting a complete ban on the entry of foreigners and
another 64% wanting strict limits on the number allowed entry. 
A comparison with the other SADC countries surveyed is instruc-
tive. In all of the other countries, the proportion of respondents want-
ing a total ban is significantly lower than South Africa: ranging from a
maximum of 10% (Namibia, Botswana) to 3.5% (Swaziland) (Table 3).
On the other hand, there is still little support for the “open borders”
concept when it comes to allowing freedom of movement within
SADC. Namibia, South Africa and Botswana are most opposed to the
idea. But even the others cannot muster much support with
Zimbabweans (at only 12.3%) the most accepting of the idea. The
majority of citizens in all countries across the region want strict limits
placed on entry, with Namibians (at 82.5%) the most enthusiastic for a
highly restrictive immigration policy. There is some support for an
immigration policy tied to job availability but this is hardly overwhelm-
ing. Namibians are least likely to favour such a policy (4.5%) while
Mozambicans (at 31.5%) are the most positive.
Southern Africans are therefore generally not in favour of open bor-
ders and prefer restrictive immigration policies. However, within this
grouping of SADC countries, South Africans are clearly most in favour
of heavy restrictions, with one in four favouring a total ban on foreign-
ers coming to the country. In some respects, Namibian and Botswana
MIGRATION POLICY SERIES NO. 30
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citizens favour a similarly restrictive approach. Mozambicans, Swazis
and Zimbabweans are somewhat more relaxed in their attitudes. By
international standards, South Africans and Namibians stand out as
being particularly opposed to greater openness in the immigration area
(Table 4). 
In policy terms, what this means is that states that pursue narrowly
nationalist immigration policies are unlikely to meet with much opposi-
tion from their citizenry. Clearly, those pushing for a more regionalist
approach to migration have a great deal to do to convince citizens.
Similarly, countries like South Africa that has developed a new jobs-
based immigration policy will need to engage in considerable public
education to convince South Africans of the wisdom of a more open
approach.
k
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Table 3: Regional Attitudes Towards Immigration
What should government do about people from other countries?(%)
South Africa Namibia Botswana Zimbabwe MozambiqueSwaziland Total
Let anyone 2.2 2.9 3.3 12.3 7.0 10.9 6.1
in who wants 
to enter
Let people in 13.1 4.5 18.0 14.6 31.5 20.6 16.8
as long as 
jobs are 
available
Strictly limit  63.7 82.5 68.3 68.9 57.8 64.9 67.5
numbers
of foreigners 
who enter
Prohibit all 21.0 10.2 10.4 4.2 3.7 3.5 9.7
from entering
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N=4 547
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Table 4: International Attitudes Towards Immigration
Prohibit people Let anyone in Let people Place strict Don’t 
coming here who wants to come as long limits on know 
from other enter (%) as there are) number of (%)
countries (%) jobs (% foreigners  
who can  
come here (%)
South Africa (1997) 25 6 17 45 7
South Africa (1999) 21 2 13 64 0
South Africa (1995) 16 6 29 49 0
Russia (1995) 18 6 48 28 2
Philippines (1995) 12 9 16 63 0
Peru (1995) 12 8 39 40 4
Namibia (2001) 10 3 4 83 0
Botswana (2001) 10 3 18 69 0
China (1995) 11 7 33 40 9
Argentina (1995) 9 8 49 31 3
USA (1995) 8 5 32 53 0
Finland (1995) 8 8 30 51 3
Chile (1995) 7 10 50 31 1
Japan (1995) 6 4 41 40 8
Nigeria (1995) 6 18 37 40 3
Spain (1995) 4 14 55 23 3
Zimbabwe (2001) 4 12 15 69 0
Zimbabwe (1997) 4 16 30 48 0
Mozambique (2001) 4 7 32 57 0
Swaziland (2001) 3 11 21 65 0
Australia (1995) 3 5 52 39 2
Lesotho (1997) 3 61 23 12 1
S. Mozam. (1997) 2 12 61 23 0
Sweden (1995) 1 8 32 55 3
Source: 1995 World Values Study; 1997, 1999, 2001 SAMP Surveys
    
PERCEPTIONS OF MIGRATION DYNAMICS
Citizen perceptions of migration and immigration are a mixtureof half-truths and misleading stereotyping. A common cross-regional perception is that inter-state migration is on theincrease. In all countries surveyed, with the exception of
Zimbabwe, the vast majority of respondents strongly believe that the for-
eign population has greatly increased in recent times (Table 5). Certainly
in the case of South Africa and Botswana, this perception is rooted in
post-1990 realities; the evidence in other countries is more ambiguous. 
There is not only a generalized perception that in-migration has
increased but that the numbers involved are massive and out of control.
Respondents in all countries surveyed consistently exaggerate the num-
bers of non-citizens in their country. Most people believe that between
1 in 3 and 1 in 4 people in their country are foreigners (Table 6). Even
taking into account undocumented migration, these figures bear
absolutely no relationship to the real situation. 
k
REGIONALIZING XENOPHOBIA?
12
Table 5: Perceptions about Foreign Influx
Has the number of foreigners coming to this country increased, decreased or stayed the same? (%)
South Africa Namibia Botswana Zimbabwe MozambiqueSwaziland Total
Greatly 46.3 58.4 69.2 10.3 46.3 54.3 48.2
increased
Increased 44.1 36.7 29.2 15.9 43.0 37.6 35.4
Decreased 5.6 2.0 0.8 37.0 7.8 4.2 8.8
Greatly 0.7 0.1 0.1 30.9 0.4 1.5 4.8
decreased
Remained 3.3 2.7 0.6 5.8 2.5 2.4 2.9
the same
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N=4 312
Table 6: Perceived Numbers of Migrants
Nationals Foreigners
No. % No. %
South Africa 969 71.3 1 035 26.9
Namibia 648 71.7 648 28.3
Botswana 558 66.7 558 33.3
Zimbabwe 645 73.2 645 26.8
Mozambique 662 78.0 662 22.0
Swaziland 587 68.2 587 31.8
      
Respondents in most countries also think that between 40 and 50
percent of non-citizens in their country are there illegally (Table 7).
Again this is almost certainly an exaggeration, consistent with the con-
fusion in many minds between illegality and immigration.
The point to emphasize here is that the ground in Southern Africa is
fertile for the development of anti-foreign intolerance. There is a gener-
alized perception amongst citizens in Southern Africa that their coun-
tries are under siege from outside. This perception, correct or not, is at
the heart of any xenophobic discourse. Rapid in-migration often does
precipitate negative responses from citizens; but so too does the mere
perception of increased in-migration.
And yet, most citizens do not “externalize” the immigration issue. In
other words, they do not see their countries as being “swamped” from
outside the region but from within. Respondents correctly think that
other Southern African countries are the major source of in-migrants
(Table 8). Southern Africa accounts for about half of all foreigners
believed to be in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Swaziland; for the other
countries the percentage is about 30%. Respondents in all six countries
think the percentage of foreigners from the rest of Africa is only slightly
greater than the percentage from Europe/North America (15% -20%).
These findings cannot, unfortunately, be compared with actual immigra-
tion statistics, which tend only to capture legal movements. What they
do indicate, however, is a strong conviction, embedded in reality, that
migration is primarily a regional phenomenon. If there were evidence of
a regional consciousness amongst citizens, one might reasonably infer
that attitudes towards migrants would be more tolerant and moderate.
Respondents were then asked why they thought people from other
countries came to their country. A multiplicity of factors were cited,
some related to the relative attractiveness of their own country (pull
factors), others related to the unattractiveness of home (push factors)
(Table 9). First, it is clear that economic motivations for in-migration
MIGRATION POLICY SERIES NO. 30
k
13
Table 7: Perceived Legal Status of Migrants
Here legally Here illegally
No. % No. %
South Africa 922 46.3 1 035 47.9
Namibia 624 56.9 624 43.1
Botswana 503 57.4 503 42.6
Zimbabwe 603 62.7 603 37.3
Mozambique 601 56.9 601 43.1
Swaziland 565 50.6 565 49.4
      
are seen as paramount by people in all of the countries surveyed. In
South Africa and Botswana, a significant number of people see the
healthiness of their own economy as a major pull factor (37% in South
Africa, 27% in Botswana). Zimbabweans (unsurprisingly) and Swazis
(more surprisingly) do not see their economies as a major draw. Second,
at least in the case of South Africa, the country’s public services are
seen as a draw card. Third, political conditions in the country of origin
versus country of destination were cited relatively consistently across
the region. Given what we know about migrant motivations from other
surveys, it is clear that citizen perceptions do reflect migrant realities.
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Table 8: Perceptions of Migrant Origins
Southern Africa Rest of Africa Europe/ Asia/Pacific
North America
No. % No. % No. % No. %
South Africa 1 034 55.0 1 034 19.2 1 034 13.7 1 034 13.8
Namibia538 33.3 538 21.5 538 19.8 538 25.4
Botswana 464 38.4 464 19.6 464 16.1 464 25.9
Zimbabwe 581 49.9 581 18.1 581 18.1 581 14.0
Mozambique 570 36.3 570 18.2 570 18.5 570 27.0
Swaziland 547 45.9 547 21.6 547 15.8 547 16.7
Table 9: Perceptions of Why Migrants Come
Reasons cited South Namibia Bots- Zimbab- Mozam- Swazi-
Africa wana we bique land
Worse/bad economy at home 8.0 7.6 11.9 7.3 5.0 9.9
Better economy here 37.0 19.0 27.2 10.3 22.5 10.0
Political conditions at home 7.8 8.5 9.7 10.6 6.8 14.2
Political conditions here 5.5 7.1 9.5 3.4 10.0 8.1
To commit crimes/cause trouble 4.8 7.8 5.2 3.1 5.2 4.3
Hunger/famine at home 2.9 3.7 11.6 8.2 3.4 10.9
Better health care, education, 17.6 7.1 4.8 9.3 4.1 5.6
etc here
Help development here 0.9 8.1 1.7 5.5 13.5 6.1
Visit, holiday, meet people 4.7 18.8 8.9 23.0 17.0 14.0
Move permanently/immigrate here 0.8 2.8 2.0 5.0 3.4 3.7
Worse/bad environmental/population 0.1 3.4 2.2 6.5 2.2 6.3
conditions at home
Better environmental/population 9.2 5.8 3.0 7.4 7.0 6.7
conditions here
Other 0.7 0.2 2.6 0.2 0.0 0.3
N 1 923 2 039 1 841 2 310 2 325 3 025
      
Another area in which perceptions bear some resemblance to reality
is that very few of the respondents (5% or less in each country) believe
that immigration per se (intent to stay) is a particularly important rea-
son motivating people to come. Again, this is consistent with the find-
ings of surveys of migrants themselves.12 This is confirmed by the data
presented in Table 10. In each country, the vast majority responded pos-
itively to the assertion that the foreigner “just wants to come and make
money and then return home.” 
Table 11 addresses this question from a different angle. Here respon-
dents were asked what proportion of migrants they thought intended to
remain permanently. The range of country scores was 30-40% with
Botswana (37%) and South Africa (41%) the highest. Temporary resi-
dents were divided up between those who intend to remain temporarily
and refugees. The point about refugees is worth highlighting. Most citi-
zens across the region believe that a quarter to a third of migrants in
their countries are actually refugees (with a high of 38% in Namibia
and a low of 23% in Zimbabwe). These are almost certainly exaggera-
tions. But they do set up the interesting question of whether citizens
distinguish between refugees and other migrants when it comes to atti-
tude formation. 
Respondents were then asked what percentage of refugees they
believed was genuine (Table 12). A very large percentage of respon-
dents in all countries surveyed, between 63% and 79%, say that 40% or
less of refugees are actually genuine. This indicates a generalized skepti-
cism about refugees and refugee claimants.
MIGRATION POLICY SERIES NO. 30
k
15
Table 10: Perceptions of Migrant Motivations 
Most people come to South Namibia Botswana Zimbabwe Mozam- Swaziland Total
this country Africa bique
because (%)
They want to 9.9 13.3 5.4 6.1 5.2 4.3 7.6
be a citizen
They want to stay 30.9 21.3 24.2 26.3 28.9 27.9 26.8
and make money, 
but don’t want to 
become a citizen
They just want to 58.8 63.2 68.1 57.5 61.2 63.2 61.9
make money and 
then go home
None 0.4 2.2 2.2 10.1 4.6 4.6 3.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N = 4 616
    
While Southern Africans have a reasonably realistic view about the
motives for in-migration and the impermanence of such movements,
they are certainly less well-informed about other aspects of the migra-
tion experience. Citizens of South Africa, Namibia and Botswana are
consistently most sceptical of migrants and refugees. The next section of
the paper therefore examines how perceptions about migration translate
into attitudes towards migrants themselves. 
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Table 11: Perceptions of Migrant Permanence
Foreigners who intend Foreigners who intend Foreigners who are 
to remain permanently ito remain temporarily refugees
No. % No. % No. %
South Africa 832 40.6 1 035 24.5 1 035 23.2
Namibia 549 32.0 549 30.1 549 37.9
Botswana 423 37.0 423 38.6 423 24.4
Zimbabwe 537 34.4 537 42.7 537 22.9
Mozambique 566 33.4 566 41.4 566 25.2
Swaziland 524 32.4 524 32.7 524 34.9
Table 12: Proportion of Refugees Thought to be Genuine
What percentage of foreigners (refugees) are genuine refugees? 
Namibia Botswana Zimbabwe Mozambique Swaziland Total
10-20% 39.2 40.3 47.4 55.8 41.0 44.8
30-40% 26.7 22.2 19.7 22.8 29.0 24.1
50-60% 18.2 16.3 13.5 12.3 18.1 15.7
70-80% 13.5 14.5 12.7 6.8 10.4 11.6
90-100% 2.4 6.7 6.7 2.3 1.6 3.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
      
ATTITUDES AND ACTIONS
At the outset of a discussion on attitudes towards non-citizens,it is worth asking where people get their information andmisinformation about migrants? Across the six countries sur-veyed there was uniformity in the ranking of information
sources: television first (a reflection perhaps of the urban-based sam-
pling method), radio second, personal interaction third, and newspapers
fourth. The media therefore plays a critical role in creating and propa-
gating images about foreigners. Studies of media coverage of immigra-
tion issues in South Africa indicate a persistent negative bias.13 The
same might well be true of regional media outlets. The NIPS survey
research would therefore seem to imply that the negative stereotyping
in the media is having a definite impact on citizen attitudes, Equally, of
course, the media could be used to promote a more accurate and bal-
anced account of migration and migrants.
What, then, do SADC country citizens really think about people
from neighbouring and other states? First, respondents were asked to
rate their impression of people from different areas on a 10-point scale
(where 1 was completely unfavourable, 5 was neutral and 10 was com-
pletely favourable). Table 14 presents the results and also allows a com-
parison between countries. Residents of sampled SADC countries have
a generally favourable impression (above 5.0) of people from Southern
Africa and other African countries. By contrast, South Africans, both
black and white, have a more negative opinion of people from other
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Table 13: Sources of Information about Foreigners
Source Frequency Total
Television 2 384 18.9
Radio 2 233 17.7
Meeting and talking to them personally 1 996 15.9
Newspapers 1 899 15.1
Through friends 1 409 11.2
Magazines 1 231 9.8
At work 1 144 9.1
Internet 89 0.7
Family 48 0.4
Other 157 1.2
Total 12 590 100.0
Total is total response since the question is multiple choice.
    
African countries (4.0). Unsurprising is the low opinion of “illegal
immigrants” across the region (1.9), with Botswana, Namibia and South
Africa again to the fore. People from Asia are generally rated negatively
(4.7) in comparison with those from North America and Europe (6.0)
and the rest of Africa. Europeans rate more favourably than Africans
from other African countries (6.0 versus 5.6) but not quite as highly as
those from Southern Africa (6.1). Perhaps the most striking finding is
that in no country are other SADC citizens regarded significantly more
favourably than Africans from elsewhere on the continent. Only in
Botswana, however, do the latter rate more favourably than fellow
SADC citizens. This is an important finding for those who argue that
that there is, or ought to be, greater consciousness of SADC as a region. 
The finding that Southern Africans make very little distinction
between foreign citizens from within and outside the SADC region is
confirmed, in the aggregate, by Table 15. Here the survey asked if the
k
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Table 14: Impressions of People from Different Areas, By Country
South Namibia Botswana Zimbabwe Mozam- Swaziland Total
Africa bique
Whites No. 1017 731 754 720 713 689 4624
6.7 8.3 7.3 8.6 7.8 7.6 4.6
Blacks No. 1015 727 748 714 716 673 4609
6.6 6.3 6.3 6.2 7.4 6.1 6.5
Coloureds No. 1011 726 712 706 710 673 4538
6.0 6.6 5.1 5.0 6.3 5.2 5.7
Asians/Indians No. 992 592 731 679 707 616 4317
5.5 5.3 3.9 5.1 5.8 4.0 5.0
People from No. 0 677 747 690 704 675 3493
Southern Africa - 5.7 5.6 6.4 7.2 5.7 6.1
People from No. 868 690 728 696 705 675 4362
other African 4.0 5.5 5.7 6.3 7.0 5.6 5.6
countries
People from No. 870 668 707 695 712 661 4313
North America/ 5.1 5.7 5.9 5.8 7.6 5.8 6.0
Europe
People from No. 902 711 763 695 718 684 4473
Asia 2.1 1.7 1.1 2.6 2.2 2.0 1.9
Illegal No. 881 707 743 698 705 683 4417
immigrants 3.5 5.2 4.8 5.5 6.3 5.9 5.1
Refugees No. 0 678 746 673 717 651 3465
- 4.8 3.8 5.3 5.6 4.1 4.7
10 = completely favourable, 1 = completely unfavourable.
    
region of origin makes a difference to their acceptability as potential cit-
izens. Responses are generally uniform with about 60% or more of
respondents in all countries of the opinion that foreigners from any
region were acceptable in their country. Only Asia scored significantly
lower. 
However, the majority of respondents in each country felt that for-
eign citizens could not become part of the nation (Table 16). The rea-
sons given are interesting. South Africans, more than anyone else, see
economic harm as the major deterrent. The association of foreign citi-
zens with illegality and crime is much stronger outside South Africa
(compare Botswana at 26% with South Africa at 10%). On the other
hand, significantly more South Africans (15%) simply think that for-
eigners should keep out because they are foreign (compared with less
than 9% in all other countries). “Overpopulation” is cited as a major
reason in Namibia, Swaziland, Botswana and Zimbabwe (all countries
in which large tracts of land are tied up in unproductive private owner-
ship).
The perception that immigrants harm a country economically is
strongest in South Africa, but not altogether absent elsewhere. The sur-
vey asked a series of questions about the local job situation and the
impact foreigners might be having (Table 17). Ironically, although the
majority of people in all countries see immigrants as a threat to jobs,
very few have personal knowledge or experience of such an occurrence.
Over 60% of respondents in South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe and
Mozambique have never heard of anyone being denied a job because it
went to a foreigner; in Swaziland and Botswana the percentage drops to
34% and 50%, respectively. Even fewer people know from their own
experience of someone being denied a job because it went to a foreign-
er; the exception to the pattern is Swaziland where almost half of the
respondents claim to know of such an occurrence. Almost 90% of
respondents in all six countries have no personal experience of being
denied a job because it went to a foreigner. 
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Table 15: Acceptability of Foreign Citizens by Region
Yes No Total
No. % No. % No. %
Europe and 2 719 61.7 1 691 38.3 4 410 100.0
North America
Other countries in 2 748 62.0 1 686 38.9 4 434 100.0
Southern Africa
Other parts of Africa 2 150 61.2 1 365 38.8 3 515 100.0
Asia 1 870 53.0 1 655 47.0 3 525 100.0
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Table 16: Reasons for Exclusion of Foreign Citizens from Citizenship
Reasons South Namibia (%) Botswana Zimbabwe Mozam- Swaziland
Africa (%) (%) (%) bique (%) (%)
Harm the economy 35.8 21.4 20.9 17.7 22.0 14.1
Engage in illegal 10.1 18.8 25.9 16.1 25.3 20.5
activities
Unable to adapt 8.4 4.1 7.0 17.8 15.1 16.3
culturally/socially
It is our country – 14.9 8.6 3.5 4.0 7.2 4.6
keep out
Cause shortages  8.6 8.2 8.9 13.4 8.8 10.3
on housing, food  
and services
Cause health 6.3 16.2 8.1 12.6 11.2 13.3
problems/disease
Cause over- 15.3 22.6 20.4 17.9 10.3 20.9
population
Other 0.6 0.1 5.3 0.5 0.0 0.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 653 903 761 753 1 090 679
Table 17: Competition with Foreign Citizens on the Job Market
No. %
Heard of anyone who has been denied a job because it went to a foreigner
More than once 1 261 28.5
Once 578 13.0
Never 2 592 58.5
Total 4 431 100.0
Personally know someone who has been denied a job because it went to a foreigner
More than once 659 15.4
Once 588 13.7
Never 3 032 70.9
Total 4 279 100.0
Been denied a job because it went to a foreigner
More than once 242 5.4
Once 244 5.4
Never 4 016 89.2
Total 4 502 100.0
     
In order to access national stereotypes, respondents were asked to
rate nationals and foreigners from different regions of the world on vari-
ous scales. The scale goes from “0” (most negative) to “10” (most posi-
tive). On each of the scales evaluated, national and foreigner ratings are
inter-mixed; that is, foreigners are sometimes rated above nationals and
other times below nationals. No consistent pattern of rating foreigners
below nationals was observed nationally or across the region. What are
more interesting are differential perceptions of non-citizens by region of
origin. 
The “work ethic” scale has the highest overall mean score (6.4)
(Table 18). In terms of attitudes to the domestic population, black peo-
ple are rated at or near the top in most countries except South Africa
(where racist stereotyping amongst whites may have played a role).
Coloured (mixed-race) people consistently rate at the bottom. Whites
have the highest ranking in Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Namibia and
Swaziland. Generally, people from outside are not see as particularly
more or less hard-working than citizens. Nor is much differentiation
made between citizens from different parts of the world.
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Table 18: Work Ethic Scale (mean scores)
South Namibia Botswana Zimbabwe Mozam- Swaziland Total
Africa bique
Whites 6.0 6.4 7.1 6.2 7.6 6.7 6.6
Blacks 5.9 7.8 6.9 8.5 8.1 7.1 7.3
Coloureds 5.3 6.1 5.5 4.0 5.4 5.3 5.3
Asians/Indians 6.2 6.6 6.4 5.4 5.7 6.5 6.1
People from 5.8 6.5 7.0 6.2 7.3 6.5 6.5
Southern Africa
People from the 5.5 6.6 6.7 6.2 7.2 6.3 6.6
rest of Africa
People from 5.9 6.7 7.1 5.8 8.1 6.4 6.6
North America/
Europe
People from - 7.1 7.4 5.8 6.1 6.3 6.5
Asia
0 = most negative, 10 = most positive.
    
The “difference scale” asked respondents to assess the similarity of
their group to other groups with 0 being fundamentally different and 10
being completely similar. Again, what emerges most strongly is that
Southern Africans make no great distinction between Africans from
inside and outside the SADC region. On the other hand, citizens of
most countries see South Africans as most similar to themselves (7.1
versus 6.1 for Southern Africans in general).
The “trustworthiness” scale has the lowest mean score (5.0), 
indicating that trust in other groups is not well developed (Table 20).
Domestically, coloureds and Asians are viewed with greatest suspicion.
Indeed, in most countries these groups scored lower than black and
white immigrants. Black immigrants and migrants are viewed with
greater suspicion than white. However, the generally low scores
attached to people from other African countries (compared to internal
scores) are consistent with the general view that Africans are a liability
and threat rather than an asset. Interestingly, again, no distinction is
made between people from Southern Africa and the rest of Africa. The
only obvious national exception is Mozambique whose citizens generally
have a less suspicious attitude to Africans from outside the country.
k
REGIONALIZING XENOPHOBIA?
22
Table 19: Difference Scale (mean scores)
South Namibia Botswana Zimbabwe Mozam- Swaziland Total
Africa bique
Whites 6.3 5.1 3.8 4.3 5.3 3.4 4.8
Blacks 5.8 8.1 7.6 8.7 8.9 8.4 7.8
Coloureds 5.6 6.4 5.1 5.4 6.4 5.7 5.8
Asians/Indians 5.1 4.2 3.4 4.3 5.0 3.3 4.3
People from 4.5 5.5 6.3 6.7 7.8 6.6 6.1
Southern Africa
People from the 4.4 5.4 6.0 6.6 7.8 6.1 5.9
rest of Africa
People from N. 5.0 4.4 4.0 4.3 5.4 3.2 4.5
America/Europe
People from - 4.0 2.9 4.2 4.8 2.9 3.8
Asia
People from - 6.3 6.7 7.1 7.7 7.9 7.1
South Africa
0 = most different, 10 = least different.
    
The final “stereotyping scale” asked respondents to consider a list of
positive and negative activities and to indicate to what extent they
thought people from Southern Africa are involved in each of the activi-
ties, with ‘0’ meaning none of them do it and ‘10’ all of them do it.
Table 21 shows that all the “negative” activities (the first five activities
listed in the table) have higher mean scores than the “positive”
activities. Looking across the data for the six countries, there is not
much consensus about the rank order of the “negative’ activities.
However, it is clear that taking jobs from locals, sending earnings out of
the country, using welfare services, and committing crimes all rank very
high. With the exception of Zimbabwe and Mozambique, “job stealing”
is highly associated with people from other Southern African countries
(8.0 in South Africa, Namibia and Botswana). Remittance behaviour is
consistently viewed as a defining characteristic of the Southern African
migrant (a perception embedded in reality). Crime and bringing disease
is also a major association in each country, with disease actually scoring
higher than crime.
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Table 20: Trustworthiness Scale (mean scores)
South Namibia Botswana Zimbabwe Mozam- Swaziland Total
Africa bique
Whites 5.8 4.8 6.6 6.7 6.4 6.7 6.1
Blacks 5.0 5.7 5.8 5.8 6.9 5.4 5.7
Coloureds 4.8 4.7 4.7 2.9 4.3 4.0 4.3
Asians/Indians 4.5 4.7 3.0 4.4 4.2 3.4 4.0
People from 4.5 4.4 4.4 5.1 6.1 4.4 4.8
Southern Africa
People from the 4.4 4.3 4.7 5.0 6.2 4.4 4.8
rest of Africa
People from N. 5.4 4.8 6.2 5.9 6.8 6.3 5.9
America/Europe
People from - 4.5 3.2 5.0 4.6 4.1 4.3
Asia
0 = least trustworthy, 10 = most trustworthy.
    
EXPLAINING INTOLERANCE
Explanations for anti-foreign intolerance commonly focus onthree sets of factors: (a) interactive (which would include theamount and character of personal exposure to people of differ-ent origin); (b) cultural (including issues of identity and nation-
al consciousness) and (c) material (including job and resources compe-
tition, relative deprivation and so on).14 Space does not allow for the
kind of multivariate analysis which would allow us to relate the attitudi-
nal profile presented in the previous section to these three sets of fac-
tors. A more detailed explanatory framework will be developed in subse-
quent papers.15 However, it is important to present the evidence on
these three factors that emerged from the survey since they are part of
the dynamic social environment in which attitudes are being formed on
migration issues within the SADC.
CONTACT
Internationally, contact with non-citizens has been shown to have both
positive and negative effects on citizen attitudes.16 In other words,
increased contact of a more personal character tends to lessen prejudice.
Casual contact can, however, have the opposite effect. Given the levels
of intolerance in some countries in Southern Africa, it is important to
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Table 21: Stereotyping Scale (mean scores)
South Africa Namibia Botswana Zimbabwe Mozambique Swaziland
Take jobs from locals 7.2 7.1 7.4 5.4 5.6 6.2
Commit crimes in 6.9 6.9 7.2 5.6 6.4 6.3
this country
Send earnings out 7.4 7.3 7.3 6.7 7.6 7.5
of this country
Use this country’s 7.1 7.2 7.5 5.9 7.5 6.7
welfare services
Bring diseases to 7.4 7.0 6.8 6.3 7.4 5.9
this country
Create jobs 3.0 4.8 5.1 5.4 5.1 5.7
Bring skills needed 3.8 5.4 6.0 5.8 5.1 6.0
by this country
0 = all of them, 10 = none of them
    
understand the amount and types of interaction that Southern Africans
have with people from outside the country and region.
Respondents were first asked about their overall level of contact
with people from other countries (Table 22). What is striking for the
region as a whole is the low overall levels of contact with groups from
virtually everywhere. Nearly half of those interviewed had none or
hardly any contact with foreigners. This is particularly ironic given that
in most countries 25% of the population is believed to be foreign (see
above). Only 15% said they had a great deal of contact with people
from other Southern African countries and a mere 10% had a great deal
of contact with Africans from elsewhere. This is all the more remark-
able given that, as mentioned above, this was an urban sample.
Inclusion of a rural sample would have reduced these figures ever fur-
ther. Some differences emerged between countries but these do not con-
tradict the overall pattern of responses.
What type of contact do nationals have with foreigners from other
parts of the world? Table 23 shows that the most frequent type of con-
tact is economic exchange, with second and third ranking activities
being working for/with foreigners, and socializing with them. There is
little difference in the ranking of these activities by country surveyed.
Living next to foreigners is ranked third or fourth and contact with
children at school is ranked about fifth. The lower ranking of these two
types of contact with foreigners reflects the relative segregation of for-
eigners’ private lives in comparison to their public presence.
Interactions with foreigners from the four world regions were evalu-
ated on a scale going from very positive to very negative (see Table 24).
Over 60% of respondents in the countries surveyed rate their interac-
tions with foreigners from the world regions (except Asia) as very posi-
tive/positive with only moderate country differences. This would tend
to confirm the hypothesis that interaction breeds tolerance and that
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Table 22: Frequency of Contact with Foreign Citizens
Great Deal Some Hardly any at all None Total
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
People from other 421 9.1 1413 30.4 628 13.5 2185 47.0 4647 100.0
countries in North 
America and Europe
People from Southern 710 15.2 1785 38.1 476 10.2 1708 36.5 4679 100.0
African countries
People from other 465 9.8 1648 34.7 510 10.7 2029 42.7 99 100.0
countries in Africa
People from Asia 77 10.7 216 30.1 107 14.9 318 44.3 718 100.0
    
one of the primary problems in generating negative attitudes is unfamil-
iarity and lack of contact with foreign nationals in the country. 
ECONOMIC CIRCUMSTANCES
Perceptions of relative national and personal economic circumstances
have been shown to have a strong correlation with attitudes towards
outsiders. When perceptions are negative, scapegoats are required and
often the visible and invisible foreigners “amongst us” take the blame.
Respondents were therefore asked a series of questions about their satis-
faction with personal economic conditions. For South Africa, Namibia,
and Mozambique respondents were more or less divided between being
very satisfied/satisfied and very dissatisfied/dissatisfied. However, for
Botswana, Swaziland, and especially Zimbabwe, far more respondents
were very dissatisfied/dissatisfied (Table 25). Do respondents think their
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Table 23: Types of Personal Contact with Foreign Persons
North Southern Other parts Asia
America/ Africa (%) of Africa (%) (%)
Europe (%)
Work for/with 26.2 19.1 23.5 15.9
Live next to them 11.2 14.5 12.7 7.4
Are friends with them 22.5 22.2 18.1 9.6
Children go to school with them 8.6 8.9 8.7 6.9
Buy things from, or sell things to them 25.1 29.2 30.9 57.7
Other 4.3 3.1 4.9 1.9
Relatives/family 2.1 3.0 1.1 0.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 3 038 4 096 3 892 2 729
Table 24: Quality of Interactions with Foreign Citizens
North Southern Other Parts Asia South
America/ Africa (%) of Africa (%) (%) Africa (%)
Europe (%)
Very positive 13.6 11.5 7.7 6.4 21.6
Positive 55.5 59.2 52.9 47.4 56.7
Neither positive nor negative 21.0 19.5 27.7 29.5 15.5
Negative 6.7 6.9 9.0 10.7 4.2
Very negative 3.3 2.9 2.7 6.0 2.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 1 904 2 407 2 592 2 003 2 696
      
personal economic conditions will improve in the next year?
Respondents in all countries are optimistic about the future, except
Zimbabweans where nearly 70% of the respondents thought their per-
sonal economic conditions would get worse/much worse (Table 26).
Country differences are strongly significant statistically.
Respondents were also asked about the national economy and their
expectations for the future (Tables 27, 28). For Namibia, Botswana and
Mozambique answers are more or less divided between satisfied and dis-
satisfied. In comparison to the other countries, people in South Africa,
Swaziland, and especially Zimbabwe (92%) are more strongly dissatis-
fied/very dissatisfied with their country’s economy. Respondents in all
countries are mildly optimistic about the situation a year from now with
scores for economic improvements showing gains for all countries; the
South Africans and the Zimbabweans are the least optimistic about eco-
nomic improvement. 
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Table 25: Level of Satisfaction with Personal Economic Conditions 
South Namibia Botswana Zimbabwe Mozam- Swazi- Total
Africa (%) (%) (%) bique land (%)
(%) (%) (%)
Very satisfied 4.6 6.2 2.5 1.4 2.8 2.8 3.4
Satisfied 32.2 40.6 26.8 9.5 31.9 16.8 26.7
Neither satisfied 15.5 20.2 11.4 6.8 26.2 19.0 16.4
nor dissatisfied
Dissatisfied 34.1 27.6 48.4 35.0 30.6 46.1 36.8
Very dissatisfied 13.6 5.4 11.0 47.4 8.5 15.3 16.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N=4 742
Table 26: Perceptions of Personal Economic Prospects One Year Hence
South Namibia Botswana Zimbabwe Mozam- Swazi- Total
Africa (%) (%) (%) bique land (%)
(%) (%) (%)
Much better 6.5 10.2 5.3 3.5 6.9 10.7 7.2
Better 34.6 47.3 44.7 17.2 49.8 32.4 37.2
Same 25.7 27.4 34.0 10.8 28.8 25.1 25.2
Worse 26.7 12.3 11.6 28.8 11.2 23.8 19.8
Much worse 6.5 2.8 4.3 39.7 3.3 8.0 10.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N=4 400
      
The general pessimism about personal and national economic cir-
cumstances that prevails through much of Southern Africa does not
provide a very positive environment within which to ply one’s trade as
a foreign citizen in another state. Levels of economic dissatisfaction are
clearly at their most intense in Zimbabwe. Here, however, the response
of citizens has not been to scapegoat but to leave. The country is expe-
riencing an extremely serious brain drain at present, as other SAMP
research has demonstrated.17 Of the other countries, levels of dissatisfac-
tion are highest in South Africa and Botswana. At one level this is
ironic, given the fact that these are two of the healthiest economies in
the sub-continent. However, anti-foreign intolerance is strong in South
Africa and growing apace in Botswana. Although no causal relationship
can be proven, these findings are certainly consistent with the percep-
tion of gloomy and worsening economic circumstances. 
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Table 27: Level of Satisfaction with National Economic Conditions
South Namibia Botswana Zimbabwe Mozam- Swazi- Total
Africa (%) (%) (%) bique land (%)
(%) (%) (%)
Very satisfied 2.3 2.1 3.7 0.8 3.0 0.4 2.1
Satisfied 13.3 38.6 35.1 2.7 29.1 14.1 21.6
Neither satisfied 15.7 25.7 18.0 4.5 31.0 16.8 18.4
nor dissatisfied
Dissatisfied 49.1 27.5 35.7 33.8 25.5 53.1 38.1
Very dissatisfied 19.6 6.2 7.5 58.2 11.3 15.6 19.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N=4 645
Table 28: Perceptions of National Economic Prospects One Year Hence
South Namibia Botswana Zimbabwe Mozam- Swazi- Total
Africa (%) (%) (%) bique land (%)
(%) (%) (%)
Much better 6.4 12.1 9.4 1.8 9.7 9.1 7.8
Better 26.9 45.7 34.5 10.1 51.8 22.5 31.2
Same 18.5 22.0 31.4 9.9 20.5 25.0 20.7
Worse 35.3 15.2 18.7 28.3 12.5 32.0 24.7
Much worse 13.0 5.1 5.9 49.9 5.4 11.5 15.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N=4 310
      
“OTHERING” FOREIGNERS
A third common set of explanations advanced in the literature is that
xenophobia is triggered by intense nationalism or nativism.18 In this
regard, anti-foreign sentiment can be a direct tool to foster nationalist
sentiment. Or it can be an incidental by-product of a heightened sense
of their own national identity by citizens. The question is also relevant
for the purposes of other questions addressed in this paper. In other
words, how strong is nationalist sentiment in Southern Africa? Is there
any evidence of a distinctive “regional consciousness”? What are the
prospects for a more regionalized approach to migration management? 
A series of questions were therefore asked about national identity
(Tables 29-31). Respondents expressed a strong consensus across the six
countries that national identity is important, they want their children
to have the same national identity, and they are proud of their national
identity. On these questions, about 90% of respondents in South Africa,
Namibia, Botswana, and Mozambique strongly agreed/agreed; for
Zimbabwe and Swaziland the agreement percentage is between 10 and
15 percentage points lower depending on the question being asked. 
Another series of questions also explored the topic of national pride.
The answers were similar with most respondents expressing very
strong/strong agreement about the importance of national pride/identi-
ty: pride in nation, national and self-identity and wanting children to
have the same national identity. Respondents in Zimbabwe and
Mozambique rated the pride questions slightly lower than respondents
in the other countries. 
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Table 29: Self-Identity and Citizenship
Being a … is a very South Namibian Batswana Zimbab- Mozam- Swazi Total
important part of African wean bican
how you see
yourself (%)
Strongly agree 56.3 57.1 67.1 46.3 31.4 42.1 50.6
Agree 39.1 37.8 26.9 34.1 58.7 34.6 38.5
Neither agree 2.8 3.6 3.0 6.8 4.3 12.5 5.3
nor disagree
Disagree 1.5 1.3 2.2 10.1 5.1 7.9 4.4
Strongly disagree 0.4 0.1 0.9 2.7 0.5 2.9 1.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N=4 752
    
Respondents did not rate the other questions on national identity
quite as highly (see Table 32). About 70% of respondents strongly
agreed/agreed about feeling strong ties with people who have the same
national identity with a high of 84% for Mozambique respondents and a
low of 63% for Swaziland respondents. 
Who is a ‘true’ national? Respondents were asked to rank various
patriotic characteristics from essential to not at all important. The vari-
ous characteristics fall into two categories. The first are those attitudes
which people acquire and have some choice about. Tables 33 and 34 are
typical of the answers to these questions. South Africans have the high-
est essential/important scores and Swazis the lowest. 
The second set of features is ascribed (i.e. determined by birth).
Non-nationals have little chance of “acquiring” these characteristics.
Birth is massively important to most people in the determination of
“national belonging”, as is having parents and grandparents born in the
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Table 30: Children’s Identity and Citizenship
You want your South Namibian Batswana Zimbab- Mozam- Swazi Total
children to think African wean bican
of themselves
as … (%)
Strongly agree 52.8 56.7 66.9 46.9 37.1 37.1 50.0
Agree 39.1 37.3 26.7 34.6 54.6 39.6 38.6
Neither agree 3.3 5.0 3.5 7.7 5.3 14.3 6.2
nor disagree
Disagree 3.9 0.9 2.1 9.2 2.8 7.1 4.3
Strongly disagree 1.0 0.8 1.6 0.3 2.0 0.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N=4 720
Table 31: National Pride
It makes you South Namibian Batswana Zimbab- Mozam- Swazi Total
feel proud to be African wean bican
a … (%)
Strongly agree 58.3 62.4 75.7 48.6 45.2 43.1 56.0
Agree 34.8 32.2 20.1 26.4 45.0 32.8 32.0
Neither agree 3.2 4.3 1.9 8.6 5.5 13.7 5.9
nor disagree
Disagree 2.5 0.9 1.5 11.3 3.7 8.1 4.5
Strongly disagree 1.2 0.1 0.8 5.1 0.5 2.3 1.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N=4 738
      
country (Tables 35-37). Far less important in this regard is race. With
the exception of Mozambique, less than half the population in each
country feels that it is essential to be “black” in order to be a citizen
(Table 38).
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Table 32: Strength of Ties with Fellow Citizens
Feel strong ties South Namibia Botswana Zimbabwe Mozam- Swazi- Total
with people who Africa bique land
call themselves
… (%)
Strongly agree 22.3 32.0 33.6 36.2 27.7 12.4 27.1
Agree 46.4 46.0 33.1 40.9 56.3 40.6 44.0
Neither agree 21.5 12.9 13.4 11.9 7.6 25.4 15.8
nor disagree
Disagree 8.4 8.0 16.2 8.2 5.6 15.8 10.2
Strongly disagree 1.6 1.1 3.6 2.8 2.8 5.9 2.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N=4 688
Table 33: Citizenship and the Constitution
Supporting the South Namibia Botswana Zimbabwe Mozam- Swazi- Total
constitution of this Africa bique land
country (%)
Essential 31.2 39.2 44.6 31.1 42.6 16.6 34.8
Important 52.4 36.1 26.8 30.8 44.1 35.9 38.5
Not very important 9.9 12.0 10.8 18.0 6.9 23.7 12.9
Not at all important 6.6 12.7 17.8 20.1 6.5 23.7 13.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N=4 519
Table 34: Citizenship and Support for Non-Racialism
Supporting  South Namibia Botswana Zimbabwe Mozam- Swazi- Total
non-racialism Africa bique land
(%)
Essential 29.0 23.2 30.5 33.3 25.8 21.1 27.3
Important 51.2 38.7 30.1 34.6 50.8 30.6 40.2
Not very important 13.3 20.6 20.4 16.8 13.4 23.2 17.6
Not at all important 6.5 17.5 19.0 15.4 10.0 25.1 14.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N=4 543
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Table 35: Local Birth as a Requirement for Citizenship
Being born South Namibia Botswana Zimbabwe Mozam- Swazi- Total
in this country Africa bique land
(%)
Essential 37.4 40.9 40.3 32.9 42.9 23.4 36.5
Important 48.0 41.2 26.0 33.7 45.7 29.4 38.0
Not very important 8.5 11.9 14.9 20.5 6.3 28.1 14.5
Not at all important 6.1 6.0 18.8 12.9 5.1 19.1 11.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N=4 731
Table 36: Birth of Parents as a Requirement for Citizenship 
Having parents  South Namibia Botswana Zimbabwe Mozam- Swazi- Total
who were born Africa bique land
in this country (%)
Essential 29.8 38.7 42.8 28.0 37.6 21.8 33.1
Important 44.8 40.6 25.3 32.6 45.9 33.1 37.5
Not very important 15.8 13.5 17.9 23.9 10.8 32.4 18.7
Not at all important 9.6 7.3 14.0 15.5 5.6 12.7 10.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N=4 720
Table 37: Birth of Grandparents as a Requirement for Citizenship 
Having grandparents South Namibia Botswana Zimbabwe Mozam- Swazi- Total
who were born Africa bique land
in this country (%)
Essential 26.9 30.5 37.4 29.9 34.3 18.4 29.5
Important 41.1 41.2 25.4 26.2 41.5 32.1 35.0
Not very important 19.4 19.8 20.5 26.5 14.7 33.7 22.1
Not at all important 12.6 8.5 16.7 17.5 9.5 15.8 13.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N=4 705
Table 38: Race and Citizenship
Being black (%) South Namibia Botswana Zimbabwe Mozam- Swazi- Total
Africa bique land
Essential 20.5 11.8 11.8 19.2 18.6 14.0 16.3
Important 25.9 22.9 18.0 19.9 36.4 13.7 23.0
Not very important 20.7 30.5 25.1 30.3 23.6 35.7 27.2
Not at all important 32.8 34.7 45.0 30.7 21.4 36.7 33.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N=4 660
         
ATTITUDES TO POLICY
In this section of the paper attention turns to the policy arena.Given the attitudinal profile described in previous sections, theobvious question is what kind of immigration policies citizenswould like to see enacted and enforced by their governments. 
Obviously citizen attitudes towards how government should respond
depend very much on whether migration is perceived as a “problem” or
not; as a “threat” to the interests of citizens or not; as out of control or
not. In the first instance it is therefore useful to know what people
think about the volume of in-migration to their countries. Respondents
were therefore asked whether they thought too many, too few or about
the right number were entering. With the exception of Zimbabwe, the
survey results show that between 72% (Mozambique) and 89%
(Botswana) think too many foreigners are entering their country. There
is thus a generalized feeling that migration is out of control.
Populations with xenophobic attitudes tend to regard national
boundaries as frontiers under siege. In this context, Table 40 provides a
regional summary of answers to a set of questions about border and
immigration control measures. There is majority support across the sub-
continent for all but one of the proposed border control measures
including deploying the army to control national borders (80.9% in
favour); requiring that foreign citizens carry identity documents with
them at all times (76.7% in favour); and allocating more resources to
border protection (51.9%). Support for sanctions against employers who
hire migrants illegally is also strong (81.6% in favour). More disconcert-
ing is that over half (53.1%) actually favour border electrification.
While there is widespread support for these control measures in princi-
ple, people do not want to pay for them themselves. More than half
(56.1%) reject tax increases to cover the cost of more patrols (with only
28.6% in favour.)
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Table 39: Attitudes Towards Volume of In-migration
South Namibia Botswana Zimbabwe Mozam- Swazi- Total
Africa (%) (%) (%) bique land (%)
(%) (%) (%)
Too many 87.8 85.1 89.1 43.5 72.0 85.2 78.0
Too few 3.8 5.0 3.3 26.6 12.9 3.8 8.8
Right number 8.4 9.9 7.6 29.9 15.1 11.0 13.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N=4 693
    
A regional sweep of this kind disguises important differences
between countries. Most respondents in the six countries think that
using the army to control borders is a good idea. Except in Swaziland,
there is also widespread support for having non-citizens carry ID at all
times. Increasing taxes to pay for border patrols is disliked by the major-
ity in all countries (except Namibia where 50.5% are in favour). On
two of the measures there is considerable inter-country variation. In the
case of allocating more money to border protection, support varies from
a high of 81% in Namibia to a low of 40% in Zimbabwe. On the border
electrification issue, Namibia (80.7%), South Africa (63.3%), and
Botswana (62.7%) all have a majority in favour of border electrifica-
tion. In Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Swaziland, the majority oppose
border electrification. 
In general, these measures show that Southern Africans share certain
perceptions. They want borders to be patrolled by armies and they want
non-citizens in their countries to be easily identifiable. On the other
hand, they are not willing to be personally out-of-pocket for the cost of
increased border controls. The differences are sharpest on two issues:
border electrification and diverting state resources to pay for border
controls. Here there are two clusters. Citizens of South Africa, Namibia
and to a lesser extent Botswana all favour draconian border controls.
Those from Zimbabwe, Swaziland and Mozambique take a considerably
more relaxed view. This grouping of countries tends to recur throughout
the survey.
A fundamental feature of xenophobia is intolerance of non-citizens
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Table 40: Regional Attitudes Towards Immigration Control Measures 
Strongly Support (%) Neither Oppose (%) Strongly 
Support (%) Support nor Oppose 
Oppose (%) (%)
Electrification of borders 25.6 27.5 9.9 22.3 14.7
Allocating more money from the 18.0 43.9 12.9 17.3 8.0
national budget to border protection
Using the army to patrol borders 32.9 48.0 8.1 7.2 3.7
Increasing taxes to cover the 7.9 20.7 15.2 28.3 27.8
expense of increased patrols
Requiring foreigners to carry 35.8 40.9 11.9 7.7 3.8
identification with them at all times
Giving the police the right to detain 39.9 42.4 9.0 6.1 2.6
suspected illegal immigrants
Penalizing businesses or persons 44.5 37.1 9.5 5.7 3.3
who employ immigrants illegally
N=4 705
    
already in the country. The fact that so many wish non-citizens to carry
ID’s suggest that they want there to be a clear and obvious differentia-
tion between those who “belong” (us) and those who do not (them).
What, then, do Southern Africans feel should be done about non-citi-
zens already in their countries? The first question is whether they would
do anything personally to stop people entering or to eject those already
there. 
Respondents were asked what they would do about citizens of other
SADC countries who impacted on their lives. Table 41 shows that, in
general, the vast majority of people would be unlikely or very unlikely
to do anything if other SADC nationals moved into their neighbour-
hood (66.6%), operated a business in their area (55.7%), shared school
facilities (72%) or became a co-worker (69.1%). The underlying
assumption (which makes the answers consistent with other questions)
is that the SADC nationals are living and working in the country legal-
ly. Hence, there is little sign of a gut-level and irrational response to the
legal presence of other-country citizens. The question, though, is
whether there are any inter-country variations. In other words, are citi-
zens of some SADC countries more tolerant of their neighbours than
others? South Africa, in fact, has the largest percentage of people likely
to take action in all four areas (between 8.0% and 12.4 % very likely to
act). 
The question of turning attitudes into actions arises again in the area
of unauthorized migration. Here there are significant differences
between the countries (Table 42). The question is what someone would
do if they suspected someone was in the country illegally. Very few peo-
ple in any country would engage in vigilante action by either using vio-
lence or using force to make them leave. There is considerable inter-
country variation on the issue of whether or not to report the suspected
unauthorized migrant from a high of 79.9% in Namibia and 72% in
Botswana to a low of only 26.8% in Zimbabwe. Contrariwise, 62% of
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Table 41: Likelihood of Taking Action against other Southern African Nationals
Very Likely (%) Likely (%) Unlikely (%) Very Unlikely (%)
Moving into your 12.4 20.9 32.6 34.0
neighbourhood
Operating a business in 12.1 22.2 21.9 33.8
your area
Sitting in the same 8.0 20.0 33.4 38.6
classroom as your children
Becoming one of your 9.2 21.7 32.2 36.9
co-workers
      
Zimbabweans said they would do “nothing” compared to a low of only
11.9% of Namibians who would do nothing. Interestingly and unex-
pectedly, South Africa is the second highest here with 44.3% saying
they would do nothing. SAMP has suggested here that when it comes
to acting on their negative feelings towards foreigners, many South
Africans are relatively passive at this point in time. Not so the citizens
of Namibia or Botswana who would identify “suspects” to the authori-
ties (and expect them to act).
Unsurprisingly, therefore, there is general support for deporting
unauthorized immigrants (87.3% in favour), non-citizens who have
committed crimes (92.3% in favour) or immigrants who do not con-
tribute to the country economically (62.8% in favour) (Table 43).
There is much less, but still some, support for deporting foreigners work-
ing legally in the country (19.4% in favour). In other words, as long as a
non-citizen is in the country legally and is contributing economically,
hostility falls off rapidly. Still, it is worth emphasizing that one in five
people do not want any foreign workers at all in their country. 
There is certainly massive support for deporting unauthorized
migrants, yet a sizable minority (42.1%) also feel that amnesties should
be offered to people in their country illegally (with only 37% opposed).
At face value, there would seem to be something of a contradiction
between these two views. It is therefore important to examine the coun-
try-by-country breakdown on this issue. 
A series of questions were asked about what kinds of immigrants
government should give preference to (Table 44). There was an almost
equal split across the region in terms of those who supported and
opposed legal immigration (43% versus 41%). Respondents in Namibia
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Table 42: Personal Actions Against Unauthorized Migrants
Do nothing Report to Report to Get people Report to Use Talk and Other Total
% police/ employer together to local violence advise % %
Home % force them community % %
Affairs to leave association
% % %
South Africa 44.3 39.3 4.5 8.5 0.4 0.0 3.0 0.0 00.0
Namibia 11.9 79.9 1.0 4.5 1.3 0.5 0.0 0.8 100.0
Botswana 14.1 72.0 3.6 7.4 0.8 0.6 1.5 0.0 100.0
Zimbabwe 62.0 26.8 2.2 4.9 1.7 1.4 0.6 0.4 100.0
Mozambique 16.7 39.1 12.4 16.9 4.6 1.1 0.4 8.8 100.0
Swaziland 30.2 37.8 6.9 19.9 3.9 0.4 0.0 1.0 100.0
Total 30.2 48.1 5.3 10.7 2.1 0.6 1.0 1.9 100.0
    
and Botswana have the largest percentage of people who strongly
oppose/oppose (about 55%) while Mozambique has the largest percent-
age who strongly support/support (almost 60%). Temporary residence
for immigrants was the clear preference of 55% of the overall sample.
However, for both South Africa and Namibia, over 40% strongly
oppose/oppose even temporary residence. No geographical area ranked
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Table 43: Regional Attitudes Towards Deportation of Migrants
Strongly Support (%) Neither Oppose (%) Strongly 
Support (%) Support nor Oppose 
Oppose (%) (%)
Deport all foreign workers even if 7.5 11.9 10.0 44.2 26.5
they are here legally
Deport all foreigners who do not 27.2 35.6 12.7 17.8 6.7
contribute to the economy
Deport all foreigners who have 65.8 26.5 2.6 2.4 2.7
committed crimes
Deport all those who live here 55.5 1.8 6.6 3.9 2.3
without permission
Offering amnesty to people who 13.2 28.9 21.0 18.6 18.4
are here illegally
N=4 742
Table 44: Migrant Preferences
Strongly Support (%) Neither Oppose (%) Strongly 
Support (%) Support nor Oppose 
Oppose (%) (%)
Foreigners who want to come here 8.3 34.9 16.1 27.2 13.4
legally to work as permanent residents
and possibly become citizens
Foreigners who want to come legally 13.1 42.3 15.3 20.0 9.2
to work for a specific period and 
then return home
Foreigners from North America 7.0 35.2 27.3 21.0 9.5
and Europe
Foreigners from Southern African 4.9 33.5 28.2 23.3 10.1
countries
Foreigners from other African 5.0 32.1 28.2 24.1 10.7
countries
People with skills not possessed 39.3 42.3 10.3 5.9 2.3
by nationals
People who will invest money in the 54.3 35.1 5.9 3.2 1.6
national economy and create jobs
N=4 636
      
significantly higher than any other as a desirable source of immigrants
(42% supported immigration from Europe/North America favour with
only 29% opposed. The corresponding figures were 44% and 33% for
SADC; and 37% and 35% for the rest of Africa). 
Once again, economic factors were paramount. The vast majority of
citizens in all countries said that they supported a legal immigration
policy tied to economic benefit. For example, 83% supported/strongly
supported government giving preference to migrants with skills not pos-
sessed locally. And 89% supported/strongly supported giving preference
to investors who would create jobs locally. 
Respondents were asked a series of questions about government poli-
cy regarding the treatment of foreigners already legally living and work-
ing in their country (Table 45). Regarding making it easier for families
of contract workers to come and live in the host country, opinions were
divided with Zimbabweans (57%) and Mozambicans (64%) backing the
idea. On the idea of contract workers qualifying for permanent resi-
dence, over half of the respondents strongly oppose/oppose this idea
except in Mozambique. Making it easier for Southern African hawkers
and traders to sell and buy things in their country or to start small busi-
nesses also receives mixed support with the strongest opposition coming
from South Africa (over 50%) and Botswana (over 55%). 
All six countries surveyed face a “brain drain” problem of one degree
or another.19 Respondents were asked how they thought government
should respond (Table 46). Almost 60% of respondents in the different
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Table 45: Attitudes Towards Treatment of Migrants
Strongly Support (%) Neither Oppose (%) Strongly 
Support (%) Support nor Oppose 
Oppose (%) (%)
Making it easier for families of 8.2 38.0 14.7 26.2 12.9
contract workers to come and 
live in this country
Making it easier for contract workers 4.8 26.3 16.5 32.6 19.8
to qualify for permanent residency 
after the completion of their contracts
Making it easier for people from 13.9 34.6 15.8 20.5 15.2
Southern African countries to sell and 
buy things in this country 
(ie hawkers and traders)
Making it easier for people from 
Southern African countries to start 
small businesses in this country 17.5 31.5 14.9 20.3 15.8
N=4 653
    
countries strongly support/support the position of making it more diffi-
cult for people to send money out of the country; Zimbabweans have
the lowest support for this idea (38%). A similar pattern is found for the
question about limiting the amount of capital to be sent out of the
country. Almost half of respondents strongly support/support making it
more difficult for skilled people to leave the country; also supported less
by Zimbabweans. Over 60% of respondents across the countries strongly
support/support making community service mandatory after completion
of degrees with Zimbabweans again expressing the least support for this
idea (39%). Mandatory community service for state bursary holders is
also strongly supported/supported (about 70% and above) and also less
supported by Zimbabweans (about 50%). There is strong support/sup-
port across the six countries for offering tax incentives to those who
remain in the country (76%). 
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Table 46: Attitudes Towards the Brain Drain
Strongly Support (%) Neither Oppose (%) Strongly 
Support (%) Support nor Oppose 
Oppose (%) (%)
Making it more difficult to send 19.3 38.8 13.4 20.7 7.9
money out of the country
Making it more difficult for skilled 15.7 33.0 14.7 25.8 10.8
people to leave
Making community service mandatory 19.8 43.3 14.2 14.6 8.1
for completion of degrees
Making community service mandatory 23.7 44.0 13.9 11.9 6.6
for state bursaries
Limiting the amount of capital to be 21.6 42.9 14.0 15.4 6.1
sent out of the country
Offering tax incentives to those 30.1 45.5 12.9 7.4 4.0
who remain
N=4 655
    
REFUGEE POLICY ATTITUDES
On the topic of refugees, respondents were asked if theythought people who are persecuted for religious, ethnic,racial or political reasons in their own countries deserve pro-tection? (Table 47). Respondents in the six countries strong-
ly agree/agree (72%) with this statement. However, over half of the
respondents in the six countries say that it is impossible to determine
whether or not a person is really a refugee. 
Respondents were asked their opinion about various government
policies towards refugees (Table 48). People generally supported giving
asylum to people escaping war and persecution (strongly support/sup-
port, 72%) although South Africa and Namibia have the largest per-
centage of people who strongly oppose/oppose doing this (28% and 22%
respectively). Increasing the number of refugees is strongly
opposed/opposed across the six countries (77%). Granting permanent
residence to refugees is also strongly opposed/opposed (61%) although
less so in Mozambique (37%). There is strong support/support (86%) for
sending refugees back to their own countries. Respondents have diverse
opinions about requiring refugees to live in camps with about half
strongly supporting/supporting this position; those in Swaziland had the
least strong support/support (30%). There are also mixed opinions about
using money from the country’s budget to shelter refugees with about
half of respondents in all six countries strongly opposed/opposed. 
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Table 47: Attitudes about Refugees
Strongly Support (%) Neither Oppose (%) Strongly 
Support (%) Support nor Oppose 
Oppose (%) (%)
People who are persecuted 25.5 46.4 11.6 10.7 5.8
deserve protection
Impossible to determine whether 12.7 41.1 18.4 20.8 6.9
a person is really a refugee
N=4 686
    
RIGHTS OF FOREIGNERS
The final section of this paper addresses important policy andpublic education issues that arise from the foregoing analysis.In other words, anti-foreign sentiments of the kind revealedabove are usually premised on the belief that migrants, immi-
grants and refugees should not enjoy the same rights as citizens (even if
those rights are protected by constitutional fiat or international conven-
tion). 
Respondents were therefore asked a series of questions about their
attitudes towards the civil rights of citizens, temporary workers/visitors,
refugees, and “illegal immigrants” (Table 49). The first question was
essentially about freedom of speech. Across all the countries, a high per-
centage of respondents think this is a right that should always be grant-
ed to citizens (85%), but respondents feel almost as strongly that tem-
porary workers, refugees and illegal immigrants do not have this right
(between 50% and 88%). The right to vote is strongly supported by
respondents in all countries for citizens (98%), and it is a widely shared
opinion in the six countries that temporary workers (78%), refugees
(87%) and “illegal immigrants” (88%) should not enjoy this right. The
right to legal protection, such as not being detained without a trial and
having legal representation, is strongly supported for citizens across the
six countries (94%), but the percentage who think it should always be
granted drops significantly for temporary workers (52%), refugees (42%)
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Table 48: Government Policy Preferences on Refugees
Strongly Support (%) Neither Oppose (%) Strongly 
Support (%) Support nor Oppose 
Oppose (%) (%)
Giving asylum to people escaping 21.2 50.3 11.6 11.1 5.7
war and persecution
Increasing the number of refugees 1.8 8.3 13.5 41.2 35.3
who enter the country
Granting permanent residence to 3.1 20.2 16.3 33.6 26.8
refugees (five years and above)
Sending refugees back to their 39.2 46.5 6.9 4.3 3.2
own countries
Requiring all refugees to live in 18.0 33.5 20.1 18.7 9.8
special camps
Using money from the national 6.1 26.4 17.4 24.4 25.7
budget to shelter refugees
N=4 691
    
and “illegal immigrants” (23%). The smallest percentages of people who
would always grant these rights to non-citizens are in South Africa. 
There is a similar pattern of responses across the six countries 
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Table 49: Attitudes Towards Rights for Citizens and Non-citizens
Should Always Depends on Never Be 
Be Granted (%) Circumstances Granted (%)
(%)
The right to say what you 1. Citizens 85.2 11.7 3.1
want, for instance, criticize 2. Temporary 13.8 36.2 50.0
the government and society. workers/visitors
3. Refugees 7.5 25.3 67.2
4. Illegal 3.1 9.3 87.6
immigrants
The right to vote. 1. Citizens 98.2 1.4 0.4
2. Temporary 6.2 16.1 77.7
workers/visitors
3. Refugees 2.5 10.6 86.8
4. Illegal 1.4 4.3 94.3
immigrants
The right to legal 1. Citizens 94.2 5.0 0.8
protection, such as not 2. Temporary 52.0 31.9 16.1
being detained without workers/visitors
trial, or having a lawyer if
3. Refugees 42.0 31.8 26.2
you go to court.
4. Illegal 22.9 20.0 57.2
immigrants
The right to be protected 1. Citizens 95.5 4.1 0.4
by the police, to be free 2. Temporary 60.9 27.1 12.0
from illegal searches, workers/visitors
and to have your
3. Refugees 51.1 28.3 20.6
property protected.
4. Illegal 23.5 20.7 55.7
immigrants
The right to social services 1. Citizens 98.6 1.6 0.1
such as education, housing, 2. Temporary 62.9 24.3 12.8
health care and water. workers/visitors
3. Refugees 55.2 24.1 20.7
4. Illegal 27.1 19.5 53.45
immigrants
N=4 700
    
surveyed for the next question about the right to police protection, due
process and protection of property. Citizens should always have the
right (96%) but many respondents think non-citizens should not have
this right. The last question in this series is about the right to social
services, such as education, housing, health care and water; and the
answers also follow the same pattern. Across the six countries surveyed,
and especially in South Africa, temporary workers, refugees and “illegal
immigrants,” are thought to be less entitled to such basic rights as legal,
police and social services. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS20
Is xenophobia a regional phenomenon in Southern Africa? Theanswer to that question is that it depends: it depends on whichcountry one is talking about, it depends on who one is speakingabout within a country, and it depends on the degree of knowledge
people have about the migration process and of particular migrants.
The first point to emerge from this inter-country study is that citi-
zens across the region consistently tend to exaggerate the numbers of
non-citizens in their countries, to view the migration of people within
the region as a “problem” rather than an opportunity and to scapegoat
non-citizens. The intensity of these feelings varies significantly from
country to country. The harshest sentiments are expressed by the citi-
zens of South Africa, Namibia and, to a lesser extent, Botswana. The
citizens of Swaziland, Mozambique and Zimbabwe are considerably more
relaxed about the presence of non-citizens in their countries. At the
most basic level, there is therefore a marked difference between
migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries. The citizens of recipi-
ent countries tend to be considerably more intolerant. That the situa-
tion is very fluid and dynamic is illustrated by the case of Botswana. As
the numbers of primarily Zimbabwean migrants has increased over the
last few years, so levels of tolerance of all outsiders have dropped.21
The second point of significance is that attitudes in the anti-foreign
“troika” (South Africa, Namibia, Botswana) are so pervasive and wide-
spread that it is actually impossible to identify any kind of typical
“xenophobe profile.” In other words, the poor and the rich, the
employed and the unemployed, the male and the female, the black and
the white, the conservative and the radical, all express remarkably simi-
lar attitudes. This poses a significant problem of explanation because it
runs counter to the more general belief that certain groups in a popula-
tion (usually those who are or who perceive themselves to be threat-
ened) are more prone to xenophobic attitudes than others. It also pro-
vides a massive public education challenge not only of knowing where
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to begin but deciding who to target. 
Third, it would be incorrect to suppose that in the remaining coun-
tries attitudes are uniformly tolerant. But these countries tend to fit the
more typical international profile. In other words, where there is intol-
erance it tends to be confined to identifiable socio-economic groups
within the population. As might be anticipated, the socio-economically
disadvantaged in these countries (the poor, the working class, the
unemployed) tend to have more negative views about migrant, immi-
grants and refugees than their better-off and more secure fellow citizens.
Fourth, in all countries surveyed it is remarkable how little personal
contact, and therefore knowledge, citizens have of non-citizens. Most
face-to-face exchanges tend to be of the economic type. In other words,
it would be fair to say that negative attitudes are held because there is
no evidence to the contrary. Those citizens who do number foreigners
amongst their friends and personal acquaintances tend to be far more
accepting and tolerant than those who do not. Interaction, in other
words, is a powerful antidote to xenophobia. But how, in practical and
policy terms, is this to be encouraged since people cannot be forced to
choose their friends? Clearly, familiarity breeds acceptance rather than
contempt. The primary challenge is therefore an educational one: to
provide citizens with direct or vicarious knowledge of migrants, immi-
grants, refugees as people through the media, and to encourage a greater
sense of continentalism and internationalism in the population through
curriculum reform at schools, the media and the public pronouncements
of opinion-makers. 
Fifth, in this context, one of the more interesting results to emerge
from this survey is the virtual absence of any sense of solidarity with
other countries in the SADC. Given the longevity of the SADC as a
formal institution, this is a significant indictment. The absence of any
real sense of “regional consciousness” (of participation in a regional
grouping whose interests are greater than the sum of its parts) has very
direct implications for migration issues. Citizens of SADC countries
make very little distinction between migrants from other SADC coun-
tries and those from elsewhere in Africa and even Europe and North
America. Where attitudes are negative, they are uniformly negative;
where positive; uniformly positive. An urgent challenge confronting the
SADC and migration-related organizations such as MIDSA is therefore
to develop strategies to build a new regional consciousness amongst citi-
zens and migration policy-makers. 
Sixth, given the attitudinal profile revealed in the NIPS surveys, it is
unsurprising that most citizens would prefer national governments to
“get tough” with migrants and refugees. There is enormous suspicion
that refugees are not genuine and there is significant fear that migrants
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are an economic threat. Perhaps the most significant and consistent
finding is the fear – certainly not confined to Southern Africa – that
migrants steal rather than create jobs. And yet, when citizens are
pressed on the issue, it is clear that this belief is generic rather than
born of personal experience. Hardly anyone in our representative sam-
ple had ever lost a job to a foreign citizen, and very few had personal
experience of this happening to their family and friends. Not many
could cite instances of this actually happening. 
Seventh, when migration is viewed as a “threat” (as it clearly is
amongst significant portions of the population and amongst virtually
everyone in some countries) it is not unusual for citizens to prefer dra-
conian policy solutions. Rather shocking is the degree of support for
border electrification. But citizens also want to see armies at the bor-
ders, tough internal enforcement and curtailment of basic rights. There
is clearly a massive job of education in the offing if policy-makers are to
turn around the obsession with control and exclusion and encourage a
countervailing sense of the potential positive aspects of migration and
immigration. Here, the NIPS survey is particularly relevant. It shows
that across the region, citizens are prepared to accept and welcome non-
citizens if their economic impact is demonstrably positive. Hence, skills-
and investor-friendly immigration policies would not be a difficult sell
to citizens. Since such policies are inevitable if countries are to be and
remain globally competitive, it is important that policy and opinion-
makers begin to build a broad public consensus on this issue. There is
nothing more off-putting to a new immigrant who wants to put their
skills to work in and for a new country to find that they are the object
of scorn and vilification simply because of their accent or the colour of
their skin. 
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